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Abstract 
 This study analyzes the potential effect of certain electoral systems – more specifically, 
ranked-choice voting – on the proportion of racial minority candidates on a mayoral ballot. In 
particular, I am focusing my analysis on two cities in California – San Francisco and Oakland – 
that have implemented the ranked-choice voting system into their local elections during the early 
21st century. I seek to answer the question: Comparing the various systems, how do different 
electoral systems explain the varying levels of racial minority descriptive representation? I am 
looking to investigate whether the evidence supports the FairVote campaign’s claim that ranked-
choice voting will inherently lead to a larger proportion of minority candidates on the ballot, sub-
sequently motivating more voters to turn out. While the study is directly measuring the propor-
tion of minorities on the ballot as the dependent variable, my goal is to further discuss implica-
tions on voter behavior if significant conclusions from my study were to come to fruition. To an-
swer the research question, I conduct a comparative study in which I match both San Francisco 
and Oakland to a city that utilizes a two-round system in order to demonstrate the expected out-
come of proportion of minority candidates had San Francisco and Oakland not adopted ranked-
choice voting. I then conduct two longitudinal studies: one for San Francisco and one for Oak-
land. The purpose of these longitudinal studies is to develop a trend in the increase or decrease of 
the proportion of minority candidates before and after implementation of ranked-choice voting. 
The chief finding of my study is relatively inconclusive; while San Francisco supported my hy-
pothesis, Oakland contradicted my hypothesis.  
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Background 
When analyzing the existing electoral systems around the world, the scholarly literature 
reflects that there are various types of political arrangements throughout society. Certain elec-
toral systems are implemented in hopes of incorporating more women or minorities into a pre-
dominantly male electoral body. Others are adopted with the aim of producing what the govern-
ment believes to be the most representative governing body. Scholars debate whether proportion-
al representation, majority or plurality electoral systems is best suited for certain communities. 
Throughout history scholars have witnessed as communities transition from one system to anoth-
er, whether that be through policy choice or merely an accident.  1
While certain scholarly literature discusses the mechanisms of specific electoral systems, 
other literature points to the influence of these electoral systems on minority political incorpora-
tion and participation. More specifically, these scholars analyze how descriptive representation 
on a mayoral ballot can potentially influence the voting behavior of certain minority groups. 
Data presented by scholar Andrea Benjamin suggests that increased descriptive representation 
may lead to an increase in minority voter turnout.  2
For the purpose of this study, I will choose to categorize black, white, Asian and Latinx 
all as types of race rather than types of ethnicities. While Latinx is excluded from the racial cate-
gory on the U.S. census and is often categorized as a type of ethnicity, research conducted by the 
Pew Research Center found that two-thirds of Latinx identify their Hispanic background as part 
 Reilly, Ben, and Andrew Reynolds. The International IDEA Handbook of Electoral System Design. Information 1
Services, Internat. IDEA, 2002.
 Benjamin, Andrea. “The Co-Ethnic Elite Cues Theory and Racial Attitudes.” Racial Coalition Building in Local 2
Elections, 2017, doi:10.1017/9781108233644.005.
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of their racial background, not as something separate from their ethnic background. Moreover, 
the Census Bureau is considering a new racial question for the 2020 census that will include His-
panic in the list of races, which already includes white, black and Asian.  Therefore, for purposes 3
of clarity and to avoid using race and ethnicity interchangeably, I will categorize these demo-
graphic characteristics as races.  
The purpose of the present research is to analyze the potential interaction between the 
ideas expressed in the scholarly literature that focuses on various electoral systems as well as that 
of minority voter behavior. Through this research I hope to demonstrate a relationship between 
the structure of a municipal’s electoral system and the electoral body’s behavior, focusing on mi-
nority communities. I’m choosing to focus on municipal elections because the ranked-choice 
voting explored by the FairVote campaign was focused on municipal elections, and elections that 
utilize ranked-choice voting appear to be composed of mostly municipal elections. The analysis 
will focus on whether a certain electoral system has an effect on the number of minority candi-
dates on a mayoral ballot.  
Research Question & Subject Significance 
Analysis of the interaction between the scholarly research on various electoral systems 
and minority voting behavior led to the following research question:  
 Gonzalez-Barrera, Ana, and Mark Hugo Lopez. “Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity or Both?” Pew Re3 -
search Center, Pew Research Center, 15 June 2015, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/15/is-being-hispanic-a-
matter-of-race-ethnicity-or-both/.
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Comparing the two systems across California at the mayoral level, how do different electoral 
systems suggest the varying levels of racial minority descriptive representation on the mayoral 
ballot? 
 The present research will focus solely on California because four of the FairVote cam-
paign’s case cities are located within California, and holding the research to one state limits the 
potential of confounding variables that may exist among different states, such as different state 
laws for municipal elections. 
Studying the effect of electoral systems on racial minority descriptive representation is 
necessary to investigate if there is a potential shift in voter participation in California’s mayoral 
elections. As later discussed, previous research has demonstrated how an increase in descriptive 
representation motivates minorities to enter the political sphere and participate in subsequent 
elections. 
Researching and discussing the potential implications that certain electoral systems may 
have on voter turnout is significant because of the current demographic shift of the U.S. popula-
tion. Experts estimate that the minority populations will comprise 56 percent of the U.S. popula-
tion by 2060 , meaning that the compilation of minority populations will make up a majority of 4
the total population, and the U.S. will become a majority-minority nation. Considering this tran-
sition to a majority-minority state, studying the voting behaviors of these specific minorities is 
becoming evermore salient. California, for example, is already a mostly multiracial state.  5
  Wazwaz, Noor. “It's Official: The U.S. Is Becoming a Minority-Majority Nation.” U.S. News & World Report, 4
U.S. News & World Report, 6 July 2015, 5:14 p.m., www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/07/06/its-official-the-us-
is-becoming-a-minority-majority-nation.
Frey, William H. “Diversity Defines the Millennial Generation.” Brookings Institution, 28 June 2016, doi:10.3897/5
bdj.4.e7720.figure2f.
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Much of the research regarding voter behavior discussed in scholarly literature was found 
to have only addressed the aggregate turnout of a state and did not break down turnout based on 
race. Looking at the aggregate turnout was appropriate when the minority groups made up a min-
imal part of the population. However, if these minorities are going to start making up the majori-
ty of U.S. population, it is crucial to start shifting research to focus on these different groups in 
order to grasp a better understanding of overall citizen voting behavior. 
Furthermore, creating an inferential connection between racial minority descriptive repre-
sentation, minority voter turnout and electoral systems is essential because of the rise in popular-
ity of the FairVote campaign. The FairVote campaign touts itself as “a nonpartisan champion of 
electoral reforms that give voters greater choice, a stronger voice and a representative democracy 
that works for all Americans.”  Part of FairVote’s goal is to increase voter voice and voter 6
turnout. Additionally, the campaign places emphasis on the idea of a representative democracy 
that works for all Americans inherently leads to the exploration of how the campaign’s proposed 
electoral reforms will influence not only descriptive representation but also racial minority voter 
turnout, as these minority groups are often the ones that have the most difficulty accessing full 
political incorporation compared to their majority counterparts. 
Literature Review 
 One aim for this study is that the results of the research will bridge the gaps between cur-
rent literature. Overall, there lacks literature on ranked-choice voting, seemingly because of the 
  “About Us.” FairVote, www.fairvote.org/about.6
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system’s newness, and its associated effects on descriptive representation or racial minority 
turnout specifically. However, a similar mechanism, single transferable vote (STV), has received 
scholarly attention. The literature was divided on STV is more closely related to a majority elec-
toral system or a proportional representation system. Single transferable vote is often applied to 
multi-member districts where voters rank their choice of representative, typically ranking their 
favorite candidate as one, second favorite as two and so on. Once a candidate garners enough 
votes, known as the quota, he or she is elected. If a quota is not reached, the candidate with the 
fewest votes is eliminated, the votes toward that candidate are redistributed to the voters’ second 
favorite, and the process is repeated until a quota is met. When STV is applied to a single-mem-
ber district, the electoral process acts identically to ranked-choice voting.  7
Scholar Nicolaus Tideman argues that STV is a branch of proportional representation , 8
whereas Norris argues that STV lies on a spectrum between majority and proportional represen-
tation . However, Andre Blais and R.K. Carty argue that proportional representation systems fare 9
better than majority systems in terms of voter turnout because proportional representation ex-
pands the number of parties, increases competitiveness and reduces distortions.  I was able to 10
extrapolate from this comparison that, regardless of the whether STV falls completely under the 
proportional representation category or lies between proportional representation and majoritari-
 “Single Transferable Vote.” Electoral Reform Society, www.electoral-reform.org.uk/voting-systems/types-of-vot7 -
ing-system/single-transferable-vote/.
  Tideman, Nicolaus. “The Single Transferable Vote.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 9, no. 1, 1995, pp. 8
27–38., doi:10.1257/jep.9.1.27.
 Norris, Pippa. “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems.” International Politi9 -
cal Science Review, vol. 18, no. 3, 1997, pp. 297–312., doi:10.1177/019251297018003005. 
 Blais, Andre, and R. K. Carty. “Does Proportional Representation Foster Voter Turnout?” European Journal of 10
Political Research, vol. 18, no. 2, 1990, pp. 167–181., doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.1990.tb00227.x.
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an, STV would produce higher turnout rates than purely majoritarian systems. This partially 
touches on the hypothesis discussed further in the upcoming section because the two-round sys-
tem used by most California cities leans more toward a majoritarian electoral system given that 
the two candidates in the runoff election are chosen based on the majority of votes.  
 That being said, Blais and Carty’s research that compares voter turnout across different 
electoral systems only compares the turnout at the aggregate level – meaning they compared the 
voter turnout in varying countries during national elections and did not further break these sta-
tistics down by demographic aspects, such as race. Much like Blais and Carty’s literature, two 
other studies that specifically focused on ranked-choice voting in the Bay Area only analyzed the 
aggregate turnout. However, the results did show an increase in turnout after implementing a 
ranked-choice voting system. In an article published by Pedro Hernandez and Jennifer Pae, re-
searchers for FairVote, the statistics show that “...in San Francisco, turnout was 80.7% of regis-
tered voters casting a ballot, which represented more city voters than ever before in history at 
414,516 votes.” In addition, turnout of registered voters was 75.4% in Alameda County, which 
houses Oakland, San Leandro and Berkeley . Oakland, San Leandro, San Francisco and Berke11 -
ley are the four cities in California that utilize ranked-choice voting in municipal elections, and, 
prior to adopting RCV, these cities used a two-round system.  
 In addition, the Center for Voting and Democracy found that, “...in San Francisco’s 10th 
supervisorial district, 92% of voters voted in Supervisor Malia Cohen's reelection under RCV. 
This is a continuation of the trend in the 10th District, in which fewer and fewer voters skip their 
local race: in 2010, 88% of voters cast ballots in the Supervisor race. In 2000, the last election in 
  Hernandez, Pedro, and Jennifer Pae. “Ranked Choice Voting in the 2016 Bay Area Elections.” FairVote, 23 Dec. 11
2016, www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_in_the_2016_bay_area_elections.
!9
the district before RCV, 83% of voters voted in the Supervisors race in November — and barely 
half as many voters turned out for the runoff election that December.’  12
One piece of literature that is key to my present study is Rocha et. al.’s article discussing 
the implications that increased descriptive representation in the state legislature has on minority 
voter turnout.  While the end goal of my research is to make connection between electoral sys13 -
tems and minority voter turnout, as stated earlier, such a direct connection cannot be made due to 
unavailable data. Therefore, in order to make such a connection, the measurement of descriptive 
representation is necessary to act as a middle man between electoral systems and voter turnout. 
However, empirical evidence is needed to demonstrate that descriptive representation does influ-
ence voter turnout, which is what Rocha et. al.’s paper accomplishes.  
Rocha finds that “...African Americans and Latinos are more likely to vote when residing 
in states with increased descriptive representation in the state legislature measured by the per-
centage of black or Latino lawmakers.” Although Rocha et. al.’s research focuses on the influ-
ence of minorities within the state’s legislature and my study is focusing on the influence of mi-
norities on the mayoral ballot, this literature nonetheless still has meaningful implications for my 
paper. These researchers further stated in their paper that having more minorities working in the 
political realm leads to a higher level of voter empowerment, an idea that can extend to the may-
oral and local circumstances of my research.  
 In essence, the goal of this study to explore whether this system of ranked-choice vote, 
  “Key Facts about the Use of Ranked Choice Voting in 2014 in California’s Bay Area.” FairVote, The Center for 12
Voting and Democracy, Apr. 2015, d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/fairvote/pages/426/attachments/original/
1449182016/Key-Facts-About-2014-Ranked-Choice-Voting-Elections-in-Bay-Area-April2015.pdf?1449182016.
 Rocha, Rene R., et al. “Race and Turnout: Does Descriptive Representation in State Legislatures Increase Minori13 -
ty Voting?” Political Research Quarterly, vol. 63, no. 4, 2010, pp. 890–907., doi:10.1177/1065912910376388.
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which runs between majority and proportional representation, contributes to a higher proportion 
of minorities on the ballot and then discuss the potential of this increased descriptive representa-
tion on voter participation.  
Hypothesis  
 When attempting to establish a concrete hypothesis, I landed on the following prediction:  
In a comparison between two-round system and ranked-choice vote electoral systems at the 
mayoral level, elections that utilize a ranked-choice vote electoral system will be more likely to 
have a higher number of racial minorities on the ballot compared to those that utilize two-round 
system electoral systems.  
 I reached this hypothesis because the research conducted by the FairVote campaign dis-
cussed earlier regarding ranked-choice voting in the Bay Area found that San Francisco’s munic-
ipal election had produced a greater racial diversity among office holders after implementing a 
ranked-choice voting system for the 2007 mayoral race.  By increasing the diversity of an elect14 -
ed body chosen to represent a nearly majority-minority city such as San Francisco, ranked-choice 
voting also has the potential to increase the descriptive representation among the representative 
body. Therefore, one can look at San Francisco’s increase in racial diversity as an instance that 
contradicts this argument that still forcing minority candidates to win the majority would deter 
them from running for office.  
 As for the implications of potentially increasing minority representation, as stated earlier 
 Hernandez, Pedro, and Jennifer Pae. “Ranked Choice Voting in the 2016 Bay Area Elections.” FairVote, 23 Dec. 14
2016, www.fairvote.org/ranked_choice_voting_in_the_2016_bay_area_elections.
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when addressing descriptive representation influence on voter behavior, the literature discussed 
how an increase in descriptive representation within an elected body would influence minorities 
to further their political incorporation, and turning out to vote is an aspect of political incorpora-
tion. Therefore, based on the increased descriptive representation that resulted from ranked-
choice voting and the results regarding the influence of representation on minority participation 
in San Francisco, it is plausible to predict that ranked-choice voting may contribute to an in-
crease in racial minority voter turnout. 
Ranked-Choice Voting Definition 
Given that ranked-choice voting is not a common electoral system within the United 
States, it is essential to clarify exactly what ranked-choice voting is. This study will present 
ranked-choice voting from the perspective of a single-member district rather than a multi-mem-
ber district because the four cities in California that use ranked-choice voting elect their mayors 
using single-member districts.  
 “First, if a candidate wins more than 50 percent of the votes cast, a winner is declared, 
and no other counting will take place. However, if no candidate wins a majority, counting con-
tinues in round two. 
 Then, in round two, the candidate with the lowest number of votes is eliminated from the 
contest. Even though the candidate has been eliminated, the voters who had that candidate as 
their first choice will then have their vote count for the candidate they marked as their next 
choice. 
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 Finally, after adding these votes to the totals of the other candidates, you can see that 
these candidates’ vote totals increase. This process of eliminating the lowest candidate and 
adding the votes to remaining candidates continues until a candidate receives more than a majori-
ty of the remaining votes cast. In the scenario, Candidate A reached a majority and is declared 
the winner after Candidate C was eliminated.”  15
Variables & Operationalization 
The independent variable will be the electoral systems at the mayoral levels. An electoral 
system is defined and will be operationalized as the method used to calculate the number of 
elected positions (in relation to the proportion of votes received) in government that individuals 
and parties are awarded after elections. The electoral system will have two different categories: 
two-round system and ranked-choice voting. The two-round system was chosen because the mu-
nicipal elections of the selected case cities – Simi Valley and Palmdale – for the comparative 
study currently utilize a two-round system. San Francisco and Oakland also both used a two-
round system prior to adopting ranked-choice voting. 
A two-round system is one in which a voter casts a single vote for their desired candidate; 
however, if a majority is not reached, then the two candidates who received the most votes will 
go head-to-head in a second election. As discussed earlier, a ranked-choice voting is one in 
which “...voters rank their candidate choices in order of preference, then choices are counted to 
  “Single-Winner Ranked Choice Voting.” Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center, www.ranked15 -
choicevoting.org/single_seat.
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determine which candidate has more than 50% of the votes after the first round of counting or if 
additional rounds of counting are needed to reach a majority.”  16
The dependent variable is the number of racial minority candidates on the ballot. A racial 
minority candidate is defined as an individual who can legitimately and legally run for the office 
in which they are on the ballot for and who is also of African American, Asian American or Lat-
inx race. The number of racial minorities on the ballot will be measured using a racial prediction 
function. Racial predictions are calculated by estimating an individual’s chances of being white, 
black, Asian American or Latino based on a comparison of that individual’s surname to the sur-
names and corresponding races on the 2000 U.S. census.  17
The racial prediction function makes probabilistic estimates of an individual’s race. The 
core of the function is based on an individual’s surname; however, providing specific external 
information, such as geographical data, increases the accuracy of the results. For the purposes of 
predicting the races of the mayoral candidates, I chose to specify the year of the census data and 
the level of geography used in merging the U.S. Census geographic data. I chose to use 2000 for 
the census year, and I chose to use “county” as the geographic level. 
The racial prediction function was chosen because although demographic information 
regarding recent candidates is readily available, there is scarce information about the candidates 
from the first five years of my sample set’s time frame, which ranges from 1998-2015. There-
fore, the racial prediction tool prevents me from having to exclude a certain time frame due to 
lack of data; rather, I can use the tool to predict the races of the candidates in earlier races. 
  “Single-Winner Ranked Choice Voting.” Ranked Choice Voting Resource Center, www.rankedchoicevoting.org/16
single_seat.
 Imai, Kosuke, and Kabir Khanna. “Improving Ecological Inference by Predicting Individual Ethnicity from Voter 17
Registration Records.” Political Analysis, vol. 24, no. 02, 2016, pp. 263-272., doi: 10. 1093/pan/mpw001.
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In order to validate the legitimacy of the racial predicting function, the function was test-
ed against Berkeley’s 2016 mayoral candidates. The 2016 mayoral election was chosen because 
2016 was the most recent election, and candidates are increasingly turning to social media to ad-
vertise their campaign; therefore, using the most recent mayoral election would make said cam-
paigns more accessible on social media. Moreover, it would be easier to find local news articles 
about more recent campaigns than it would be to find older campaigns. 
Using Facebook past news articles, I was able to find the candidates’ names as well as 
each candidate’s race. Facebook and news articles were reliable in determining race because de-
mographic information, including race, was documented on either the campaign’s Facebook page 
or in the body of the news story. The list of candidates and their corresponding race is as follows: 
I. Jesse Arreguin — Latino 
II. Laurie Capitelli — White 
III. Kriss Worthington — White 
IV. Ben Gould — White 
V. Bernt Wahl — White 
VI. Zachary Runningwold — Native American 
VII. Guy Lee — Asian American  
VIII.Naomi Pete — African American 
After gathering the candidates and their racial information, the information was inputted 
into an excel document, which included information regarding each candidate’s surname, first 
name, job occupation, zip code, state and county code. 
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 With this spreadsheet created, the race prediction of each candidate was computed, and 
the racial results of the computation were compared to those found on campaign websites and 
local news articles. The prediction correctly estimated the race of Laurie Capitelli, Kriss Wor-
thington, Ben Gould, Bernt Rainer Wahl, Guy Lee and Naomi Pete – 75 percent of the candi-
dates. As for Jess Arregiin and Zachary Runningwolf, whose names produced the same predic-
tions across all races, the prediction was unable to confidently estimate their races. However, I 
believe that a 75 percent success rate is enough to justify continuous use of the race prediction. 
 Lastly, some control variables that could pose issues as  competing explanations are a 
city’s median income, education levels and levels of employment. While working to create a 
plausible match for the selected cases for a comparative study, these control variables will need 
to be included. 
Case Selection 
San Francisco and Oakland were chosen as the two case selections because these are two 
of the four cities within California that have adopted ranked-choice voting within their mayoral 
elections. San Francisco first used ranked-choice voting for the 2007 mayoral election, and Oak-
land first used ranked-choice voting for the 2010 mayoral election Unfortunately, the data gener-
ated by the census excluded both Berkeley and San Leandro, the remaining two cities that utilize 
ranked-choice voting; therefore, Berkeley and San Leandro will be excluded from this study due 
to insufficient data. 
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The time frame of the selected cases will vary depending on the type of study. Two sepa-
rate studies will be conducted on these cases: a comparative study and a longitudinal study. 
For the comparative study, San Francisco and Oakland will be matched with respective 
counterpart cities, both of which will also be in California, based on certain demographic facts, 
including race, income, education level and income status. These comparative studies will begin 
with the last mayoral election before San Francisco and Oakland implemented ranked-choice 
voting – the 2003 and 2006 mayoral elections, respectively. The study will end with the 2007 
mayoral election in San Francisco and the 2010 mayoral election in Oakland. The study only in-
cludes one mayoral election after implementation because the comparative study is concerned 
with measuring the immediate change in descriptive representation following the implementation 
of ranked-choice voting; therefore, following years are not necessary in this portion of the study. 
The longitudinal study will use the time frame of 1999-2015 for San Francisco and 1998-
2014 for Oakland. Both time frames begin prior to the cities’ implementation of ranked-choice 
voting, and both time frames will include five mayoral elections.  
By conducting a longitudinal study among San Francisco and Oakland during a time 
frame that includes elections from both a two-round system and a ranked-choice voting system, 
the subsequent results will compare racial minority descriptive representation in a two-round sys-
tem to representation in a ranked-choice voting system with less concern of confounding vari-
ables under the assumption that there was not much institutional change within each city during 
the selected time frame that could also influence turnout. The change in minority descriptive rep-
resentation after the new voting scheme was implemented will also be measured  by extending 
the time frame to include years of two-round system elections. 
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 As for cases involving cities currently maintaining a two-round system, a comparative 
study using Simi Valley (as compared to San Francisco) and Palmdale (as compared to Oakland) 
will be conducted. Simi Valley and Palmdale will be used as comparisons to San Francisco and 
Oakland because the former two cities are most similar to the latter two in terms of certain de-
mographic factors: racial-makeup, per-capita income, educational attainment and employment 
status. These demographic statistics were generated using the U.S. census.  
 The goal of utilizing Simi Valley and Palmdale is that a cross-city comparison will bolster 
the findings and the relationship found between electoral systems and minority descriptive repre-
sentation. Graphing and comparing the trends of both two-round-system cities will help establish 
a trend among descriptive representation that the two RCV cities should have followed had they 
not adopted RCV. Therefore, the difference between the trends of the two-round-system cities 
and the trends after each city (San Francisco and Oakland) implemented RCV can be measured 
as a potential effect of RCV on descriptive representation. The goal of using cities that are most 
demographically similar to the RCV cities is to limit the possible influence of confounding vari-
ables, such as race, income, education and age.  
Research Design 
A dual-part comparison will be conducted for this research: one comparison will be sole-
ly among the two cities that implement RCV to see their shift in minority descriptive representa-
tion over time, and the second comparison will be a cross-city comparison among two pairs of 
cities, four cities total. As previously stated, the cross-city comparison will entail that each RCV 
!18
city is matched with a comparable two-round-system city. Matches will be based on the demo-
graphics of each RCV city the year prior to its implementation of RCV. The goal of this is to 
measure the difference in trend between each pair.  
To measure the difference between the ranked-choice voting cities and two-round system 
cities, I will be using a difference-in-differences test. The difference-in-differences test compares 
the longitudinal data from a control group to the data from a treatment group.  For this research, 18
the cities that utilize ranked-choice voting – San Francisco and Oakland – will be the treatment 
groups, whereas Simi Valley and Palmdale will be the control groups. As for the data, the propor-
tion of minority candidates in the election prior to implementation of ranked-choice voting and 
the first election following implementation will be calculated. For San Francisco, those elections 
will be 2003 and 2007, meaning Simi Valley’s 2002 and 2006 elections will be used to calculate 
the proportion of minority candidates in Simi Valley. The purpose of comparing San Francisco to 
Simi Valley is to see what the observed outcome trend should have looked like given the out-
come of the control group, Simi Valley. Because Simi Valley was most similar to San Francisco, 
we could rationally expect the trend in San Francisco’s proportion of minority candidates to 
match that of Simi Valley’s between elections. Therefore, any observed deviation in San Francis-
co’s outcome from Simi Valley’s could be measured as the intervening effect, or the effect that 
ranked-choice voting had on the proportion of minority candidates.  19
 “Difference-in-Difference Estimation.” Difference-in-Difference Estimation, Columbia University Mailman 18
School of Public Health, www.mailman.columbia.edu/research/population-health-methods/difference-difference-
estimation.
 Angrist, Joshua D., and Jorn-Steffen Pischke. Master ‘Metrics: The Path from Cause to Effect. Princeton Univer19 -
sity Press, 2014
!19
Making sure that the best, most analogous match is determined for each city is incredibly 
pertinent to this study as to insure that the confounding variables are as limited as possible. The 
selected matches were chosen by using Mahalanobis distance matching.  
The Mahalanobis distance is a measure of the distance between a point P and a distribu-
tion D. It is a multi-dimensional generalization of the idea of measuring how many standard de-
viations away P is from the mean of D. The Mahalanobis distance was used to not only measure 
the variance of each variable – race, educational attainment, income and employment status – but 
also the covariance between each of these variables. Measuring both the variance and covariance 
of each variable allows me to compute the total distance between my selected origins – San 
Francisco and Oakland – and each remaining city in the census. After computing the Maha-
lanobis distance matching, the city that had the smallest distance to each city with ranked-choice 
voting was determined by locating the index of the minimum of a numeric vector. 
In order to match cities, data was extracted from IPUMS USA that included the racial 
breakdown, educational attainment, employment status and income total of a random sample of 
citizens from 45 California cities during the years 2000 and 2006. The data set was then subset-
ted into two different data frames: one for 2000 and one for 2006. From a dummy variable was 
created for each category of race, each category of educational attainment, each category of em-
ployment status and each category of income total. 
 The income levels were separated into six categories: 
1. Less than or equal to $24,300/year – $24,300 was the California poverty line in 
2016.  20
 Bohn, Sarah, et al. “Poverty in California.” PPIC, Public Policy Institute of California, July 2018, www.p20 -
pic.org/publication/poverty-in-california/.
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2. Greater than $24,300 but less than or equal to $50,000 
3. Greater than $50,000 but less than or equal to $75,000 
4. Greater than $75,000 but less than or equal to $100,000 
5. Greater than $100,000 but less than or equal to $200,000 
6. Greater than $200,000 
The number of dummy variables equal to one in each category for each city was aggregated, and 
those aggregates were placed into individual columns. This process was done for both the 2000 
data set and 2006 data set. 
After aggregating the data for each city in both years, a Mahalanobis distance match was 
administered for both cities. For the year 2000, the Mahalanobis distance matching was run 
against the San Francisco vector and found Simi Valley, CA to have the minimum distance from 
the San Francisco vector. Repeating the Mahalanobis distance matching for 2006, Palmdale was 
found to have the minimum distance from the Oakland vector. 
As for both comparisons, the number of racial minority candidates on the ballot was ana-
lyzed using the racial prediction function, and the totals were subsequently tallied for each may-
oral election. The total number of racial minority candidates was then divided by the total num-
ber of candidates in order to find the percentage of minority candidates compared to that of ma-
jority candidates on the ballot.  
The purpose of this design is to develop a trend within each city’s mayoral elections to 
see, firstly, if there is an upward or downward trend of percentage of minorities on the ballot and, 
secondly, to see the strength of that trend.  
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By measuring the trends of each city using a longitudinal study, a potential shift in trend 
within each of the two cities is observable. For example, was San Francisco holding steady at the 
number of minorities on the mayoral ballot prior to its first RCV election, and did that shift to an 
increase in the number of minorities on the ballot once the city began utilizing RCV? 
Data Sources and Data Collections 
In order to find the demographic makeup of selected cases, I relied heavily on the Ameri-
can FactFinder resource provided by the United States Census as well as the IPUMS USA data 
collection and extraction service. This site generated the racial makeup, total population, total 
income, employment status and educational attainment levels for roughly 45 California met-
ropolitan areas from the years 2000 and 2006. 
As for finding the names of all mayoral candidates from 1998 to present, the California 
Elections Data Archive (CEDA) provides data records and excel sheets of all data surrounding 
local elections within California. The data records provide me with the city, the year of the elec-
tion and all names on the ballot for a corresponding election.  
Results: Comparative Study 
After calculating the race predictions and graphing the results for each pair of cities, two 
contradictory graphs were produced. While San Francisco’s trend in descriptive minority repre-
sentation adhered to my hypothesis, meaning that the city saw an increase in proportion of mi-
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norities on the mayoral ballot, Oakland saw a negative trend in proportion of minorities on the 
mayoral ballot. 
!  
 I) San Francisco and Simi Valley: Prior to adopting the ranked-choice voting system, San 
Francisco had one minority candidate in the 2003 mayoral race between nine total candidates, 
making the proportion of minorities on the ballot 11 percent. Simi Valley, on the other hand, had 
100 percent of white candidates on the city’s 2002 mayoral ballot. In the following 2006 elec-
tion, Simi Valley remained consistent and had a mayoral ballot comprised of 100 percent white 
candidates. Based on the demographic similarities between Simi Valley and San Francisco, we 
could expect the proportion of minority candidates to remain stagnant at 11 percent in San Fran-
cisco for the 2007 election, just as the proportion in Simi Valley had remained stagnant. Howev-
er, San Francisco saw an increase in proportion of minority candidates. The 2007 mayoral elec-
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tion produced a candidate pool comprised of 27 percent minorities, a 145 percent increase in 
proportion from the previous election. 
!  
 II) Oakland and Palmdale: While San Francisco showed an upward trend in the propor-
tion of descriptive representation on the mayoral ballot after adopting ranked-choice voting, 
Oakland experienced a decrease in minority descriptive representation in the election immediate-
ly following the adoption of ranked-choice voting. In the city’s final mayoral election using the 
two-round system, Oakland’s mayoral ballot was comprised of 50 percent minority candidates – 
one African American and three Latinos. However, the first election utilizing ranked-choice vot-
ing saw a candidate pool – 40 percent of which were minority candidates. While there was an 
increase in the total number of black and Asian American mayoral candidates, the number of 
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white candidates had doubled from three to six compared to the previous election. There was 
also a decline from two to zero Latino candidates in the candidate pool. 
Results: Longitudinal Study 
 Along with the comparative study, a longitudinal study was conducted in which the over-
all trend of minority descriptive representation was studied in both San Francisco and Oakland 
throughout an extended time period. For San Francisco, the proportion of minorities on the may-
oral ballot was measured in five election cycles: 1999, 2003, 2007, 2011 and 2015. For Oakland, 
the proportion of minorities on the mayoral ballot was also measured in five election cycles: 
1998, 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014.  
!  
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 I) San Francisco: Prior to adopting the ranked-choice voting system, San Francisco was 
experiencing a decline in minority descriptive representation on the mayoral ballot from 1999 to 
2003. However, following the first election using ranked-choice voting in 2003, the city saw a 
steep increase in minority descriptive representation with a jump from 11 percent of minorities 
on the ballot to 27 percent in 2007 to then a 54 percent of minorities in 2011. This upward trend 
continued until the 2015 election when the city’s proportion of minority candidates fell to 34 
percent. 
 II) Oakland: Contrary to San Francisco, Oakland experienced a decline in the percentage 
of minority candidates for over a decade. The percentage of minorities on Oakland’s mayoral 
ballot peaked at 100 percent in 2002, eight years before the first mayoral election using ranked-
choice voting. However, that proportion was halved in the next election and ultimately declined 
to 33 percent in the 2014 mayoral election. Despite a constant decline since 2002, the rate of de-
cline decreased slightly after implementation of the ranked-choice voting system. The 2006 elec-
tion – the last two-round system election – saw a 50 percent decrease in minority descriptive rep-
resentation from the previous election; however, 2010 was only a 10 percent decrease in repre-
sentation. The following election in 2014 was only a 7 percent decrease in proportion of minority 
candidates.  
Conclusions 
 The results of both comparative and longitudinal studies do not appear to conclusively 
support my original hypothesis, which argued that ranked-choice voting would inherently pro-
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duce a higher proportion of minority descriptive representation on the mayoral ballots. While 
San Francisco’s observed outcome demonstrated an increased proportion of minority descriptive 
representation as compared to Simi Valley’s stagnation, Oakland’s observed outcome demon-
strated a decreased proportion of minority candidates as compared to Palmdale. Therefore, al-
though the intervention effect of ranked-choice voting on San Francisco supported my hypothe-
sis, the intervention effect of ranked-choice voting on Oakland contradicted my hypothesis. Fur-
thermore, over the extended observation time in the longitudinal study, Oakland showed a steady 
declining trend after adopting ranked-choice voting, whereas San Francisco showed a steady in-
creasing trend until the 2015 election, where the proportion declined. Without conclusive evi-
dence supporting or contradicting my hypothesis regarding descriptive representation, further 
implications of the potential influence of a ranked-choice voting system on minority voter 
turnout could not be concretely produced. 
Implications 
 Although my hypothesis could not be conclusively proven,  the research conducted pro-
vided several insights for future studies. Firstly, while Oakland did show a decreasing trend 
compared to Palmdale, one of the white mayoral candidates was a member of the LGBTQ com-
munity. For the purposes of my study and analyzing racial descriptive representation, she was 
excluded from the minority proportion. However, as a member of the LGBTQ community, she 
would be considered a minority candidate in other social realms, given that most previous candi-
dates have been cis, heterosexual men or women. If this research were to expand to include the 
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LGBTQ community in the proportion of minority candidates, I suspect that both Oakland and 
San Francisco would have seen higher minority proportions. 
 Secondly, the disparity between San Francisco’s increasing trend and Oakland’s decreas-
ing trend lends the question: Is there a second intervening factor that intersects with ranked-
choice voting? For example, have minority communities started distancing themselves from local 
government due to distrust, and the prospect of ranked-choice voting does not rectify such dis-
trust? Measuring public perception of local government and the interaction between such percep-
tion and the implementation of ranked-choice voting may provide more insight into the effect of 
ranked-choice voting on a city. 
 Lastly, future research may want to analyze the interaction between ranked-choice voting 
and issue saliency in these cities during the election. If one of they key issues being discussed 
prior to the election is pertinent to minority communities, will that saliency, combined with 
ranked-choice voting, motivate more minority candidates to run for office? 
 Regardless of the potential second intervening factor, the FairVote campaign’s claim that 
ranked-choice voting inherently leads to more minority candidates on the ballot appears to be 
somewhat unsubstantiated. In order for the campaign to establish a sound claim, more research 
needs to be done surrounding other possible confounding variables. Moreover, this research fo-
cused solely on mayoral elections, but future research may want to shift focus more to city coun-
cil elections to see if city council elections demonstrate similar trends to those of their mayoral 
counterparts.  
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